Embedded Files
I am primarily an applied theorist. Most of my work is concentrated in economic theory although more recently I have started theory projects in finance as well.
Forthcoming/Published
"Decision Making under Climate Change Deep Uncertainty (forthcoming)"
Peer reviewed chapter in Rethinking Markets, Reimagining Policy: Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz and His Contribution to Modern Economics, CUP. Chapters collected as part of Professor Stiglitz's 80th anniversary festschrift. I investigate two ways of twisting the standard Savage subjective expected utility axioms that are appealing under uncertainty posed by climate change.
"Income Contingent Loans as an Unemployment Benefit"
with Joseph Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun
Imperfections in risk and capital markets imply that individuals who lose jobs suffer from imperfect smoothing of consumption across states and times. Compared to the first best, there will be too little search. Optimal unemployment programs, which balance the marginal benefit of consumption smoothing vs. the marginal cost of the insurance externality, increase welfare and may even increase GDP. Our analytical results suggest that welfare is higher if the unemployment benefits program includes income-contingent unemployment loans (ICL), where the amount repaid depends on the individual’s future income. Such loans can be financed by a risk premium imposed on the unemployed who avail themselves of the loans, and partially substitute for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Optimal unemployment benefits programs (UB) with ICL do a better job of smoothing consumption across states and time, and in particular total benefits when unemployed increase. We analyze how changes in key parameters, such as the degree of risk aversion and the nature of post-employment work, affect the design of the optimal UB program and the magnitude of the incremental benefits from including income-contingent loans.
Coverage: MarketWatch
Climate Clubs, Efficiency and Participation
(with Prajit Dutta)
The paper studies how international transfers can Pareto improve agreements on emission reductions. It re-interprets as a club model a well-studied model of treaty participation. Without transfers, equilibrium club size is limited to being at most 2 or 3 countries. With bi-lateral transfers, transfers voluntarily given by club members to non-members, club size increases to at least N/2, where N is the total number of countries. Furthermore, inclusive of transfers, there is a Pareto improvement for all N countries. Any further expansion and welfare improvement requires multi-lateral transfers in which non-members can also commit to making transfers. In that setting, there is an equilibrium with full participation of all N countries and Utilitarian Pareto optimal emissions reductions by every country. If the transfer choices are sequentially made, then that globally implemented reduction is the unique equilibrium action.
Presentations: Columbia University Center for Political Economy Workshop 2025, Stanford University Political Economics of Environmental Sustainability Conference 2025, World Congress of the Econometric Society 2025 -- Political Economy.
Work in Progress
"Conflicting Clauses in Contracts (2025)"
Show that statements to the effect of A and ~A in the same contract can be optimal in the presence of deep uncertainty.
"A Micro-Founded Neo-Fisher Effect (2023)"
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse